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CULTURAL AND RISK-RELATED DETERMINANTS 
OF GENDER DIFFERENCES IN ULTIMATUM BARGAINING 
 








We study culture and risk aversion as causes of gender differences in ultimatum 
bargaining. It has often been conjectured in the literature that gender differences in 
bargaining experiments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Using the 
data obtained from our experimental sessions with Spanish subjects, we are able to 
disentangle risk-related and genuinely gender-specific effects in ultimatum games 
framed as salary negotiation between an employer and an employee. First, we confirm 
the broadly accepted result that women are more risk averse than men. Gender 
differences in both employer and employee-subjects' behavior remain significant after 
risk attitudes are accounted for. In fact, we show that the reported gender differences 
are not because of but rather despite females' higher risk aversion. Gender effects are 
found to depend also on cultural differences. Greek and Spanish females reject more 
and offer lower wages than males. British subjects exhibit gender effects only with 
respect to employee behavior, but the sign of the effect is opposite to that observed in 
the case of Greece and Spain. 
 
JEL Classification: J30, C91 
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 I Introduction
A well-known theoretical and experimental framework in which fairness and
bargaining have been analyzed is that of ultimatum games. In an ultimatum
game, two players bargain over a pie of size Y in the following way: The ¯rst
player (leader) o®ers a share X 2 [0;Y ] to the second (follower) one, claiming
Y ¡X for himself. The second player has to decide whether to accept or reject
the o®er. If the o®er is accepted, the proposed shares are gained by the players.
Otherwise, they both earn nothing. Since the seminal experiment by GÄ uth et
al. (1982), the game has inspired a vast literature. Bearden's (2001) exhaustive
review indicates that results are sensitive to a number of factors. Typical
¯ndings include systematic deviations from the subgame perfect equilibrium
prediction of minimum o®ers by leaders and acceptance of all positive o®ers
by followers. Instead, a fairer split is the most frequently observed outcome.
An implicit assumption underlying ultimatum bargaining is that both par-
ties' involvement is needed for the pie to be earned, ¯rst, and then divided.
The most obvious real world example of such asymmetric negotiations can be
found in salary formation resulting from employee-employer interaction. How-
ever, bargaining between employers and employees never occurs over \manna
from heaven". If an employer had full control of the pie, why would he need a
second agent with whom to share his own property? In the real world, ¯rms re-
sult from combining complementary assets like, for example, labor and capital.
Salaries o®ered by employers and accepted by employees should re°ect each
party's involvement in the common enterprize. Following standard economic
theory, raising one's cost of participating in a partnership should increase the
own aspired and actual share of the resulting pro¯t. In this paper, we test
this hypothesis. First, we frame ultimatum bargaining as a situation of salary
negotiation. Second, we introduce a real task which has to be performed by
employee-subjects as a consequence of accepting a given salary. We show that
real e®ort raises salaries. In fact, this result is due to both higher salary o®ersby employers and higher rejection rates by employees.
We focus now on gender as one of the determinants of behavior in ulti-
matum game experiments. Our analysis is based on a series of experimen-
tal sessions which do not ex ante control for the composition of sessions and
employee-employer pairs in terms of gender. Among a number of novel design
aspects introduced in these experiments1 two are going to be of great impor-
tance in the present study. First, we use the lottery panel method introduced
in Sabater-Grande and Georgantz¶ ³s (2002) as a pre-play test capturing our
subjects' attitudes towards risky choice. In that way, we can explicitly and
rigorously address the question of whether, and to what extent, gender dif-
ferences in bargaining experiments are due to di®erences in risk attitudes and
whether the gender-e®ect persists after risk attitudes have been accounted for.
Second, we run the experiment in di®erent countries (Spain, Greece and the
UK) so that we can test for gender di®erences due to cultural disparities across
countries.
I.1 Basic Experimental design
The experiments reported here were run as a part of a more general, ongoing
project investigating several labor market-related phenomena like unemploy-
ment, contract security, cultural and gender di®erences, etc. All sessions were
run in the Laboratori d'Economia Experimental (LEE) at Castell¶ on, Spain.
Forty subjects were recruited among Business Administration students. They
were randomly assigned to one of the two treatments labelled hereafter as HT
(Hypothetical Task) and RT (Real Task). At the beginning of each session,
subjects were randomly assigned the role of an employee or an employer. Each
subject's role was kept ¯xed along the whole session. To avoid end-game ef-
fects, sessions were randomly stopped between the 30th and the 35th period.
1The most prominent novel feature is a real task performed by the employees in the
baseline treatment.
4In each period, subjects were randomly matched to form employer-employee
pairs. In order to avoid undesirable session e®ects, subjects in each session
were divided into two separate matching groups.2
At the beginning of each session, written instructions3 were given to the
subjects. The experiment was framed as a situation in which an employer
o®ers his/her employee x 2 [0;10] Euro in steps of .10. Acceptance by an
employee in HT implies that the 10e pro¯t is realized by the ¯rm and divided
as proposed by the employer. In addition to realizing pro¯t and sharing it as
de¯ned in HT, acceptance by an employee-subject in RT implies accepting to
perform a real task: ¯lling each of 20 numbered envelops with its corresponding
single-page letter. The envelop-¯lling sub-session was organized in a separate
room next to the computer lab. Payment and, when applicable, task per-
forming obligations, were determined as the sum of earnings, respectively task
units agreed, in 5 randomly chosen periods. Apart from their earnings in the
experiment, subjects received a 5e show-up fee to mitigate di®erences in earn-
ings across player types. Average earnings were approximately 25e. Proposer
(responder) participants earned 29e (21e) on average. The computerized4
salary-negotiation sub-session (HT and RT) lasted on average one hour. The
duration of the task-performing sub-session (RT only) never exceeded 30 min-
utes, but varied signi¯cantly across subjects, depending critically on the task
load.
I.2 The role of the Real Task
For the sake of comparability, we have analyzed the same number of observa-
tions per treatment. Thus, we focus on the analysis of data obtained from the
¯rst 33 periods of each session. We summarize here our main ¯ndings.
2Di®erences across groups were found not to be statistically signi¯cant and data reported
here are the result of aggregation within each treatment.
3Available upon request.
4Programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
5O®ers Salaries Rejections
Treatment HT
N 330 275 55
Median 4.00 4.00
Mean 3.96 4.00 17%
Std. Dev. 0.21 0.16
Treatment RT
N 330 222 108
Median 4.50 4.70
Mean 4.09 4.55 33%
Std. Dev. 1.30 0.80
Table 1: Descriptive statistics by treatment.
Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics on o®ers, salaries and rejec-
tions. A ¯rst ¯nding concerns the resemblance of our HT treatment to standard
ultimatum game experiments. Both salary o®ers and accepted salaries are not
signi¯cantly di®erent from 4. This means that in the absence of a real task,
our experiments reproduce the results usually obtained in standard (abstract)
ultimatum experiments. We summarize this in the following result.
Result 1: The \labor-market" frame of ultimatum bargaining yields the
standard 60%-40% split of earnings.
Both the median (4 vs. 4.5) and the average (3.96 vs. 4.09) of salary o®ers
posted by employers are lower when employees are faced with a ¯ctitious task
than when they have to perform a real one. Using a Mann-Whitney test
and treating individual averages as independent observations shows that the
di®erence is weakly signi¯cant at a 10% level (p=0.694).
In Table 2, the ¯rst column under each treatment's heading presents the
number of salary o®ers per 1/2e interval. Approximately 86% of all salary
o®ers (284/330) collected under treatment HT concentrate on a single peak
between 3.7 and 4.2e. The distribution of salary o®ers collected under the RT
treatment exhibits two peaks. One of them is observed on the 3.7-4.2 interval,
corresponding to 30% (100/330) of all salary o®ers. Another 40% (127/330)
6Treatment HT Treatment RT
O®er (x) N % Rej. C.D. N % Rej. C.D.
x < 0:7 0 17 88 15
0:7 · x < 1:2 0 15 87 28
1:2 · x < 1:7 0 0
1:7 · x < 2:2 0 1 100 29
2:2 · x < 2:7 0 3 100 32
2:7 · x < 3:2 3 100 3 2 100 34
3:2 · x < 3:7 25 64 19 9 90 42
3:7 · x < 4:2 284 13 55 100 42 84
4:2 · x < 4:7 17 0 55 50 24 96
4:7 · x < 5:2 1 0 55 127 9 107
5:2 · x < 5:7 0 2 50 108
5:7 · x 0 4 0 108
Table 2: Number (N) of o®ers and percentage of rejections within each o®er
interval. C:D: refers to the Cumulative Distribution of the number of rejec-
tions.
of the observed salary o®ers correspond to the interval between 4.7 and 5.2e.
Finally, 50 observations correspond to salary o®ers between these two modes.
These di®erences in the distribution of salaries across treatments give further
support to the ¯nding that salary o®ers are higher in RT than in HT.
Apart from the distribution of salary o®ers, Table 2 can be used to study
di®erences in employees' behavior expressed in terms of rejection rates. Under
each treatment's heading, the second and third columns present, respectively,
rejections in absolute numbers and as a percentage of o®ers. Salary o®ers
below 3.2e are rejected in almost all cases under both treatments (except
for 4/38 o®ers in RT). We focus on o®ers above 3.2e. In both treatments,
rejection rates decrease as salary o®ers increase. However, the percentage of
rejections in each salary o®er interval is higher under the RT treatment. This
result receives signi¯cant support if we compare across treatments rejection
rates for salary o®ers in the 3.7-4.2 interval (13% in HT vs. 42% in RT).
Below, we summarize these ¯ndings.
Result 2: Employers make higher salary o®ers when employees have to
perform the real task.
7Result 3: In the range in which the number of observations allows mean-
ingful comparisons to be made (3:2 · x < 5:2), a given salary o®er is more
frequently rejected by employees in the real task treatment.
Going back to Table 1, we observe that salaries are higher in RT than
in HT. This is true for both the median (4 vs. 4.70) and the mean (4 vs.
4.55), and the di®erence is signi¯cant as indicated by a Mann-Whitney test
(p=0.000). This result is stated below.
Result 4: Higher salaries (accepted o®ers) are observed when employees
have to perform the real task.
It can also be observed from Tables 1 and 2 that both salary o®ers and
actual salaries (accepted o®ers) present a higher dispersion in RT than in
HT, as can be also con¯rmed by the standard deviations reported in table 1.
The latter ¯nding suggests that a real task introduces more heterogeneity in
employers' behavior.
The percentage of successful contracts over the number of employee-employer
matchings is used as an indicator of e±ciency in ultimatum bargaining. How-
ever, in our experiment, the costs and bene¯ts of the real task should also be
taken into account. Unfortunately, the realism-enhancing device of the real
task makes it impossible to rigorously compare the two treatments in terms
of e±ciency, since the costs of performing the task are unknown. Instead,
we concentrate on employment rates, measured as the percentage of accepted
salary o®ers. From simple inspection of total rejection percentages (17% in
HT vs. 33% in RT) provided under the third heading of table 1, we reach the
following result.
Result 5: Overall employment is lower when employees have to perform a
real task.
8II Gender and Bargaining in the Literature
The role of gender in human decision making has been extensively analyzed in
the literature. More speci¯cally, gender di®erences have been investigated in
the laboratory using several environments like the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
(PDG), the Dictator Game (DG) and the Ultimatum Game (UG).5
An exhaustive review of the experimental evidence on gender di®erences
in subjects' bargaining behavior is beyond the scope of this work. However,
we will try to focus on some intrinsic °aws in the analysis of gender as a
determinant of a subjects' economic decisions.
Studies on gender di®erences arrive, generally speaking, to di®erent conclu-
sions. For example, in a PDG context, authors like Rapoport and Chammanh
(1965), Kahn et al. (1971) and Mack et al. (1971) ¯nd that men are more co-
operative than women. However, work by Arano® and Tedeschi (1968), Meux
(1973) and Ortmann and Tichy (1996) ¯nd the opposite result. Alternatively,
some studies ¯nd that gender is not a determinant factor of economic behav-
ior. Such is the case -in a context of public goods- of Sell and Wilson (1991),
Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993), Sell et al. (1993), Nowell and Tinkler
(1994), Seguino et al. (1996), Sell (1997) and Cadsby and Maynes (1998).
The same lack of consensus is found in the context of the Dictator's Game6
(DG). Whereas Bolton and Katok (1995) or Frey and Bohnet (1995) ¯nd no
gender di®erences, authors like Eckel and Grossman (1996, 1998) and Andreoni
and Vesterlund (2001) report signi¯cant di®erences in the behavior of men and
women.
As far as the Ultimatum Game (UG) is concerned, Eckel and Grossman
(2001) run the ¯rst UG experiment speci¯cally designed to test for gender ef-
5See Eckel and Grossman (2005) for an exhaustive revision of di®erences in the eco-
nomic decisions of men and women. They examine these di®erences in several experimental
scenarios.
6In the DG, player 1 (the allocator) is given a ¯xed amount of money to divide between
himself and player 2.
9fects in the bargaining process. In their design, they implement an UG which
is repeated along eight rounds. Proposers and respondents are matched using
a face to face protocol. Each subject plays four rounds as a proposer and four
rounds as a respondent. The sex of a subject's partner is made known by
having a group of four proposers seated facing a group of four respondents.
The design matches players with partners of their own gender, partners of
the opposite gender or a mixed group. Subjects have no information on their
partner's identity. They ¯nd that women's proposals are, on average, more
generous than men's, regardless of the sex of the partner, and women respon-
dents are more likely to accept an o®er of a certain amount. Furthermore, a
given o®er is more likely to be accepted if it comes from a woman, a result
which is interpreted as chivalry. Women paired with women almost never fail
to reach an agreement, a fact that is interpreted by the authors as solidarity.
Saad and Gill (2001) conduct a one-shot UG in which subjects face ran-
domly a subject of the same or contrary gender (i.e. man to woman, man to
man, woman to man and woman to woman). Each subject knows the sex of
his/her partner. They ¯nd that males make more generous o®ers when pitted
against a female. Furthermore, females made equal o®ers independently of the
other's sex.
In a set up similar to ours, Solnick (2001) conducts an one-shot UG game
using the strategy method7. The analysis involves two treatments. In a ¯rst
treatment, subject anonymity is preserved, while in the second treatment both
types of players know the other player's gender. She ¯nds that both sexes make
lower o®ers to women and that both sexes choose higher minimum accepted
o®ers when he/she faces a woman-employer. In general, the highest rejection
rate exists when a woman-employer faces a woman-employee.
A less game-speci¯c result is that of Sutter et al. (2003), where the in°uence
7Under the strategy method, the type 1 player decides the o®er and, at the same time,
the type 2 player records a minimum acceptable o®er. If player 1's o®er equals or exceeds
player 2's minimum acceptable o®er, the o®er is accepted and the pie divided according
player 1's proposal.
10of gender on economic decision making is analyzed in a bargaining experiment
of the principal-agent type. They conclude that gender per se has no signi¯cant
e®ect on behavior, whereas gender pairing has a strong in°uence. Much more
competition and retaliation and, thus, lower e±ciency, is observed when the
bargaining partners are of the same gender than when they are of the opposite
gender. Close to this result, Gneezy et al. (2003) ¯nd a signi¯cant gender gap
in performance in tournaments and that this e®ect is stronger when women
have to compete against men than in single-sex competitive environments.
The authors argue that women may be less e®ective than men in competitive
environments and that maybe the explanation is that women are more risk
averse.8
There are many important studies which con¯rm the view that women tend
to be more risk averse than men. Powell and Ansic (1997) show that their
female subjects are less risk seeking in laboratory tasks than men. However,
other experimental studies reach di®erent conclusions. For example, Schubert
et al. (1999) ¯nd that women are, on average, more risk averse in abstract
gambling tasks in the gain domain, less risk averse in the loss domain, and not
consistently di®erent from men in context-rich tasks in either domain. They
conclude that gender speci¯c risk behavior in previous survey data may be due
to di®erences in males' and females' opportunity sets rather than stereotypical
risk attitudes. Intuitively, gender di®erences in risky decision making should
a®ect behavior in bargaining environments. For example, risk averse subjects
should be expected to post higher o®ers. In that case, there may be two co-
existing e®ects of gender on bargaining behavior: a pure gender e®ect and a
risk-related one. The coexistence of pure and risk-related gender di®erences in
bargaining behavior has not been explicitly addressed in the literature so far.
More recently, several studies report cultural di®erences in UG experiments.
In their meta-analysis, Oosterbeek et al. (2004) ¯nd that country di®erences
8See Byrnes et al. (1999) and Meier-Pesti (2005) for the relation between sex and risk
from a psychological perspective.
11are re°ected on respondents' behavior only and not on the shares o®ered to
them. The paper by Chuah et al. (2005) identi¯es attitudinal dimensions (like
altruism and fairness) of culture which signi¯cantly in°uence experimental be-
havior of Malaysian and UK subjects. However, none of these papers addresses
the issue of how gender e®ects vary across countries and cultures.
In this paper we are interested in the relation between gender di®erences
and subjects' attitudes towards risk, on one hand, and the relation between
gender and cultural di®erences, on the other hand, as explanatory factors of
behavior in the ultimatum game. An important di®erence between our design
and most of the literature reviewed above is that, in our experiments, sub-
jects do not receive pre-play information or any feedback on the other player's
gender. Therefore, the gender e®ects reported here can not be attributed to
chivalry or solidarity.
With respect to the ¯rst question, we o®er a more rigorous test of the
usual conjecture that gender di®erences in experimental games are partly due
to di®erences in risky decision making. Regarding the question whether gender
e®ects are due to cultural di®erences, we compare behavior of subjects from
three countries: Spain, Greece and the UK.
Our main ¯nding is that gender di®erences are signi¯cant in both employer
and employee behavior. Females o®er lower salaries and this e®ect becomes
stronger after risk attitudes are accounted for. Thus, a genuine, non risk-
related, gender e®ect exists. Furthermore, the risk-related and the genuine
gender e®ects go into opposite directions: the former yielding higher and the
latter lower o®ers. Thus, the claim that gender di®erences are due to risk
attitudes is not con¯rmed by our analysis, because, if gender di®erences were
due to di®erences in risk attitudes, females should be found to post higher,
not lower, salary o®ers. In the same fashion, we ¯nd a signi¯cant gender e®ect
among employee-subjects. Female employees tend to reject more. However,
risk aversion leads to lower rejection probabilities. Like in the case of em-
ployers' behavior, the pure and the risk-related e®ects go into two opposite
12directions. Both ¯ndings with respect to the interplay between gender and
risk aversion as explanatory variables of behavior in bargaining experiments
contradict the usual claim that gender e®ects are due to di®erences in risky
decision making. Female players of the ultimatum game do not o®er less and
reject more than males because of but rather despite their higher risk aversion.
With respect to the second question concerning the cultural causes of gen-
der di®erences, we estimate gender e®ects of similar signs and sizes for Greek
and Spanish subjects, whereas a qualitatively di®erent gender e®ect is found
for British subjects.
III Experimental design
III.1 A pre-play test of risk attitudes
At the beginning of the experimental session, subjects respond to the lottery-
choice by Sabater and Georgantz¶ ³s (2002).9 Each of the lottery panels in Table
3 corresponds to a discrete version of a continuum of lotteries. The table
presents the payo®s corresponding to the favorable outcome of each lottery
whose winning probability (q) is given at the top of each column. Each subject
is asked to choose the most preferred lottery from each panel. Observe that
the farther right the subject chooses, the less risk averse he/she is, whereas risk
neutral (and risk loving) subjects would choose q = 0:1 in all panels. Panels
are designed in such a way that risk is compensated by a di®erent (for each
panel) linear (in the unfavorable outcome) increase in the expected monetary
reward. Data obtained from this lottery choice task are used to construct an
index of subjects' degree of risk aversion de¯ned as the average choice across
panels. Thus, a higher average probability chosen implies higher degree of risk
9Instructions on this task can be accessed in Sabater and Georgantz¶ ³s (2002). We run
this test only for the sessions made in Spain.
13aversion.10
Table 3: Panels of lotteries
Panel 1
q 1:0 0:9 0:8 0:7 0:6 0:5 0:4 0:3 0:2 0:1
X e 1:00 1:12 1:27 1:47 1:73 2:10 2:65 3:56 5:40 10:90
Choice
Panel 2
q 1:0 0:9 0:8 0:7 0:6 0:5 0:4 0:3 0:2 0:1
X e 1:00 1:20 1:50 1:90 2:30 3:00 4:00 5:70 9:00 19:00
Choice
Panel 3
q 1:0 0:9 0:8 0:7 0:6 0:5 0:4 0:3 0:2 0:1
X e 1:00 1:66 2:50 3:57 5:00 7:00 10:00 15:00 25:00 55:00
Choice
Panel 4
q 1:0 0:9 0:8 0:7 0:6 0:5 0:4 0:3 0:2 0:1
X e 1:00 2:20 3:80 5:70 8:30 12:00 17:50 26:70 45:00 100
Choice
III.2 The main experiment
In the context of an UG, employer/employee pairs negotiate over their re-
spective shares from a 10e pro¯t earned from a given task which must be
performed by the employee. In the baseline treatment, hereafter the Salary
Negotiation Experiment with a Real Task or SNERT, the task is real and a
unit of it corresponds to ¯lling 20 numbered envelops with their corresponding
numbered single-page letters. The SNERT was run in three di®erent countries:
10Other properties of the test and its interpretation in terms of theories of risky decision
making are discussed in Sabater and Georgantz¶ ³s (2002).
14Spain11, Greece12 and the UK13.
Each experimental session of the SNERT was divided into two di®erent
sub-sessions: One during which Ultimatum Salary Negotiation took place and
another one, in which employees performed their Real Task obligations. After
this, all subjects were paid as we will explain later. The ¯rst sub-session
consisted of two parallel procedures. Namely, i) randomly formed employee-
employer pairs14 play the salary negotiation ultimatum game, which is repeated
over a randomly determined number of periods ranging between 30 and 35, and
ii) subjects respond to a payment-card type of control question designed to
elicit their valuations (certainty equivalent) of the game.
In ¯ve randomly chosen periods of the main experiment, the control ques-
tion format is repeated using an incentive-compatible design to control for vari-
ations in a subject's valuation of the game due to learning and due to changing
from a hypothetical to a real-incentive environment. The hypothetical valu-
ations of the game are denoted by HV and the 5 incentive compatible ones
by RV1 to RV5. Given the lack of any systematic hypothetical bias (measured
as di®erences between hypothetical and real valuations), in the econometric
models, we have used Ver and Vee which are constructed as the average of each
employer/employees' valuations obtained as responses to the hypothetical and
the incentive compatible formats of the control questions.
After the negotiation periods were completed and data were collected for
each session, 5 periods were randomly chosen by the computer to determine
each employer-subject's earnings and each employee-subject's salaries and real
11In the Laboratori d'Economia Experimental (LEE) at the University of Castell¶ on.
12In the Computer Lab of the Economics Department at the University of Macedonia.
13In the Computing Laboratory of the Economics Department at the University of Ab-
erdeen.
14In order to avoid confusion between session and treatment e®ects, subjects in each
session were divided into two separate matching groups. Di®erences across groups within
the same treatment were found not to be statistically signi¯cant and data reported here
are the result of pooling across groups. Each subject's role was kept ¯xed along the whole
session.
15task obligations. Real rewards were paid to employees at the end of the task-
performing sub-session, while employers were rewarded just after the end of
the salary negotiation sub-session.
Additional to the SNERT, 4 alternative treatments were run in Spain. As
described with detail in subsection III.5, they are labeled as T1, T2, T3 and
T4 and they are used to study the e®ects of some design features, such as
random versus permanent employee-employer pairs, real versus ¯ctitious task
and ordering e®ects in the hypothetical valuation of the game.
A total of 140 subjects (seven sessions with 10 employers and 10 employees
per session) participated in this experiment. Subjects were university students
of economics-related degrees. Each subject was assigned once to a single ses-
sion. Sessions lasted an average of one hour and a half each. Approximately,
average earnings per subject earnings were slightly below 25e. Speci¯c soft-
ware was written using Urs Fischbacher's z-Tree toolbox.
III.3 Game-theoretic prediction and expected results
In the one-shot version of the game, the equilibrium prediction involves a
(sel¯shly) rational employer o®ering a minimum amount, say X = 0:10, to
the employee and the latter accepting the o®er. Numerous studies have pro-
duced evidence favoring systematic deviations from this prediction on both
sides of the employer-employee pair (the former often o®ers more than mini-
mum amounts and the latter often rejects \unfair" o®ers). Of course, the real
task implies some cost to be borne by the employees, which should have a posi-
tive impact on wages o®ered by employers and on the minimum acceptable o®er
for employees as compared to abstract ultimatum bargaining games. Further-
more, the repetition of the game over an unknown (by the subjects) number
of periods (theoretically equivalent to an in¯nitely repeated game) leads to
\fairer" equilibrium predictions, given that \altruistic" behavior by employers
and equity-seeking behavior by employees can be explained on the ground of
16inter-temporal rationality. Typically, idiosyncratic di®erences among subjects
(inequity aversion, toughness in bargaining, patience in \punishment" strate-
gies to convince the employer for a better salary, etc.) result in a variety of
outcomes, which crucially depend on whether pairs are formed by randomly
matching employers to employees over a long number of periods (\partners"
protocol) rather than changing the pairs every period (\strangers" protocol)
in which case \punishment" strategies by unfairly treated employees aim at a
\social" rather than a \partner-targeted" learning of fairness rules.
III.4 Treatments
Apart from the main experiment (SNERT) discussed above, we study four
di®erent wage bargaining settings. The main characteristics of each treatment
are included in Table 4:
² TREATMENT 1 (T1): Random pairs formed in each period; permanent
roles, randomly assigned at the beginning of the session. The task is
¯ctitious in order to control for the e®ect of the real task on observed
behavior.
² TREATMENT 2 (T2): Randomly formed (once) ¯xed pairs. We aim
at studying the e®ects of a permanent and repeated relation between an
employer and an employee. The task is hypothetical and subjects answer
the control question before the game starts.
² TREATMENT 3 (T3): Like in Treatment 1, but with control questions
answered after, rather than before the experiment. We aim at study-
ing the e®ect of own experience from the experimental labor market on
subjects' hypothetical valuation of it.
² TREATMENT 4 (T4): Like in Treatment 2, but with control questions
answered after, rather than before the experiment.
17Table 4: Main characteristics of the experimental design
Treatments N Male Female Markets HV Matching Task
SNERT SP 20 6 14 10 Ex-ante Random Real
SNERT GR 20 9 11 10 Ex-ante Random Real
SNERT UK 20 12 8 10 Ex-ante Random Real
T1 20 11 9 10 Ex-ante Random Hypothetical
T2 20 10 10 10 Ex-ante Fixed Hypothetical
T3 20 15 5 10 Ex-post Random Hypothetical
T4 20 10 10 10 Ex-post Fixed Hypothetical
Total 140 73 67 70
IV Results
IV.1 General results and descriptive statistics
In this section we present, ¯rst, some descriptive statistics and then discuss
the results obtained from a more thorough econometric analysis.
In Table 5, we show average hypothetical valuations (HV ) of the game
considering all subjects (i.e. both employer- and employee-subjects), as well as
disaggregated HV for males and females. In addition, this table includes mean
salary o®ers (MO) proposed in each experimental treatment, distinguishing
between salary o®ers made by men and by women. Except for female's o®ers
in T2, all actual o®ers lie below subjects' hypothetical valuations of the game
from an employee's point of view. Interestingly, this result is also con¯rmed,
but with more exceptions, if we focus only on those subjects who actually
acted as employers during the experiment. Table 6 presents mean salary o®ers
(MO) and average hypothetical valuations of this restricted sample (denoted
as HVer). Again, actual mean o®ers are lower than hypothetical valuations
of the setting from an employee's point of view, with the exception of T2 in
which the contrary occurs for the whole sample and for males (no di®erence
exists for females), and T4 in which females make higher o®ers than their
stated hypothetical valuations from an employee's point of view. That is,
18Table 5: Average Hypothetical Valuation (HV ) and Mean O®ers (MO)
HV HV -M HV -F MO MO-M MO-F
SNERT SP 4.65 4.75 4.61 4.09 4.53 3.80
SNERT GR 5.13 4.89 5.32 4.06 4.11 3.98
SNERT UK 4.45 3.92 5.25 4.97 4.91 5.06
T1 4.78 4.77 4.78 3.96 3.95 3.97
T2 4.65 4.90 4.40 4.46 4.36 4.50
T3 4.52 4.63 4.20 4.04 4.07 4.01
T4 4.65 4.65 4.65 4.30 4.23 4.58
Table 6: Average Hypothetical Evaluation of employer-subjects (HVer) and
Mean O®ers (MO)
HVer HVer-M HVer-F MO MO-M MO-F
SNERT SP 5.25 5.00 5.42 4.09 4.53 3.80
SNERT GR 5.40 5.25 5.63 4.06 4.11 3.98
SNERT UK 5.45 4.92 6.25 4.97 4.91 5.06
T1 4.55 4.50 4.58 3.96 3.95 3.97
T2 4.45 4.33 4.50 4.46 4.36 4.50
T3 4.25 4.30 4.20 4.04 4.07 4.01
T4 4.55 4.56 4.50 4.30 4.23 4.58
permanent employee-employer matching leads employers to make salary o®ers
which may lie closer to and even higher than their own HVer reported under
the hypothetical situation in which they acted as an employee. Whether the
elicitation of the hypothetical valuation took place before or after the session
(T1 vs. T3 and T2 vs. T4) does not seem to play any systematic role in this
¯nding, indicating that our subjects' valuation of this bargaining environment
from an employee's point of view does not depend on experience gained over
the session.
Table 7 includes average salaries of successful contracts and average period
pro¯ts earned by employers and employees in each treatment. Taking the
Spanish data set into account, the highest average salary corresponds to the
baseline treatment, which is the only one in which employee subjects had to
perform the real task. The di®erences of 0:55e between SNERT and T1
19and 0:26 e between SNERT and T3 are statistically signi¯cant15 and can
be interpreted as the shadow market price of the cost borne by employees
when performing the task of ¯lling 20 envelops with their corresponding one-
page letters. Other di®erences are in the expected direction: Fixed-matching
treatments (T2 and T4 over T1 and T3) yield higher salaries, con¯rming the
analogies that can be drawn between our experiment and real world labor
markets, where repeated employer-employee interaction should be expected to
mitigate opportunistic or excessively sel¯sh behavior by the employers. Non
systematic evidence is obtained on the possible e®ects of the HV ' elicitation
procedure on observed behavior, given that T1-T3 di®erences are signi¯cant,
whereas T2-T4 di®erences are not (see Table 18 in the appendix).
The SNERT has yielded the lowest salaries in Greece and the highest in
the UK. Spain lies in between and all di®erences are statistically signi¯cant.
It is interesting that the observed salaries in the SNERT reproduce the rank-
ing of the three countries in terms of GDP, consumer price indices and wage
levels. This implies that replicating the same experimental setup in di®erent
countries may lead to di®erences which depend on the levels of income and
other macroeconomic determinants of subjects' opportunity costs and target
earnings. Following these di®erences, but not trivially, the resulting average
period earnings of employees are also signi¯cantly di®erent across countries.
The ranking follows the aforementioned ranking with UK in the ¯rst, Spain
in the second and Greece in the third place. In that sense, employers' pro¯ts
in Table 7 follow exactly the opposite ranking, implying a more egalitarian
sharing of the 10-euro pie in the UK and a more unequal one in Greece. A
more detailed analysis of the forces underlying this ¯nding is provided later
in the text, where econometric models of o®er and rejection determinants are
estimated using panel techniques.
15The results obtained from non parametric Mann-Whitney tests on the comparison of
treatment pairs in terms of salaries is provided in Table 18.
20Table 7: Salaries-Employers' Pro¯ts
Average Salaries Employers' Pro¯ts
Male Female
N Sal. St.D. Prof. St.D. N Prof. St.D. N Prof. St.D.
SNERT SP 222 4.55 0.80 3.66 2.64 132 3.88 2.37 198 3.52 2.81
SNERT GR 231 4.21 0.40 4.05 2.68 198 4.14 2.63 132 3.93 2.76
SNERT UK 225 5.19 0.60 3.28 2.30 198 3.23 2.35 132 3.36 2.22
T1 275 4.00 0.16 5.00 2.24 132 5.18 2.08 198 4.87 2.35
T2 231 4.50 0.60 3.85 2.57 99 4.98 1.87 231 3.37 2.68
T3 234 4.29 0.71 4.05 2.66 165 4.08 2.70 165 4.02 2.63
T4 261 4.45 0.52 4.39 2.31 264 4.24 2.45 66 4.97 1.50
In Tables 8, 9 and 10 we show the evolution of o®ers and the rate of
rejections per treatment. We observe some learning e®ects. Tables 9 and 10
show two di®erent sides of rejected o®ers. The former focuses on the gender of
rejected proposers, whereas the latter focuses on the gender of the employee
rejecting the o®er. These di®erences will be discussed in more detail using
regression analysis. We present, ¯rst, graphics with the evolution and the
distribution of o®ers and subjects' hypothetical valuation. Figure 2 indicates
that employees' HV di®er across treatments, whereas some (moderate) gender
di®erences are observed in Figure 3. Figure 4 re°ects the increasing time
trend which is a common feature of all treatments and both male and female
subjects' behavior. Figure 5 presents o®er frequencies, which exhibit very
similar patterns across treatments. In Figure 6 we observe moderate gender
e®ects. Finally, Figure 7 shows the distribution of accepted and rejected o®ers.
IV.2 Country di®erences and gender e®ects
Table 11 reports results from the estimation of the baseline model of o®ers
capturing the main features of employer behavior.16 Signi¯cance levels are
16We have used the technique of Feasible Generalized Least Squares with random e®ects
for the estimation model.
21denoted by an asterisk (two, three) corresponding to a con¯dence interval of
90% (95%, 99%). It can be seen that a signi¯cant gender e®ect is obtained.
Overall, female subjects make lower o®ers than males. Furthermore, the UK
dummy is signi¯cant, implying that subjects in the Aberdeen session have been
posting higher wage o®ers than Greek employer-subjects, whose corresponding
coe±cient is nonsigni¯cant, and the Spanish who are used here as the reference
group. T2 and T4 dummies con¯rm a signi¯cant positive e®ect of permanent
matching on the wage o®ered to employees.
However, our interest is in the interplay between country and gender dif-
ferences. In Table 12 we present three country-speci¯c models on employers'
behavior. The gender dummy coe±cient is nonsigni¯cant for British employ-
ers. In the other two countries, female employers have posted signi¯cantly
lower wage o®ers. In fact, both coe±cient estimates and the corresponding
statistics are of very similar sizes. Both the baseline model and the country-
speci¯c models con¯rm an increasing tendency of o®ers over time. That is,
employers learn to make higher o®ers, probably because they gain experience
on employees' revealed minimum acceptable wages. Also, we estimate a neg-
ative e®ect of the employer's Ver elicited on the hypothetical case that the
employer acted as an employee. This is an interesting ¯nding, as it shows that
the higher a subject values a given bargaining environment, the lower he/she
is o®ering a compensation for \others" to accept participating in it.
Tables 15 and 16 present the results from the estimation of rejection mod-
els describing employees' behavior. As we should expect, higher o®ers entail a
lower rejection probability. In fact, we have estimated a model including the
quadratic transformation of salary o®ers, as preliminary explorative analysis
indicated a superior performance of this speci¯cation with respect to the linear
one. This may be due to the fact that employees tend to accept with total
certainty o®ers above a given (high) threshold and reject o®ers below another
(low) threshold. Thus, rejection probabilities are not linearly correlated with
o®ers. Greek employees have a lower and British employees a higher rejection
22probability. Overall, females reject more than males. The country-speci¯c
rejection models in Table 16 indicate that Greek and Spanish female employ-
ees reject more than males, whereas British female employees reject less than
males. No systematic ¯ndings can be reported on the e®ects of the T1-T4
dummies in rejection behavior. The expected positive e®ect of a subject's hy-
pothetical valuation on his/her rejection probability is only con¯rmed in the
case of Spain.
As a preliminary conclusion, we observe that signi¯cant gender di®erences
exist and they signi¯cantly vary across countries. Greek and Spanish females
behave similarly to each other and they both di®er from British subjects in the
same way. Females from the two Mediterranean countries o®er lower wages
than males and reject with a higher probability, whereas females from the UK
post similar wage o®ers and reject less than males.
IV.3 Gender e®ects and risk attitudes
In this subsection, we study the interplay between gender and risk attitudes.
We focus on the data obtained from the sessions in Spain, which include ad-
ditional information on our subjects' risk attitudes. As we have already con-
¯rmed from the preceding discussion of the baseline model, a signi¯cant gender
e®ect exists. Namely, females o®er lower salaries than male subjects do.
However, our design allows us to test for the validity of the usual claim
made in the literature that gender e®ects in bargaining experiments are partly
due to females' higher degree of risk aversion. First of all, it is worth reporting
that the basis for this claim should be the relationship between gender and
risky decision making. This ¯nding is also con¯rmed by our data as shown
by the result of a simple regression in Table 13, in which females are found
to choose safer lotteries in our lottery-panel task. This result seems to agree
with a large part of the literature on this matter17. Thus, the next step is to
17An interesting way of attributing this ¯nding to feminine behavior independently of
23run a model including both gender and risk aversion among the explanatory
variables of the observed o®ers.
Table 14 reports results from such a model. With respect to our main
question, we con¯rm that risk aversion a®ects18 posted o®ers in the expected
direction: the more risk averse a subject is, the higher the o®ers he/she posts.
However, this contrasts with the fact that females (who are found to be more
risk averse than males) make lower salary o®ers, which suggests that the gen-
uine gender and the risk-related e®ects go into two opposite directions: the
former tends to lower o®ers, while the latter yields higher ones. By inspection
of the estimates obtained, it can be checked that, once subjects' risk atti-
tudes are accounted for, the gender e®ect becomes even stronger19, because
the risk-related counter-e®ect is now absorbed by the risk attitude coe±cient.
We move now to a model designed to identify the factors a®ecting an
employee-subject's probability of rejecting a certain salary o®er. Table 17
presents the results. As reported on the model estimates presented in Tables
15 and 16, a higher salary o®er entails a lower rejection probability. Contrary
to the o®er model, the period variable is non signi¯cant, indicating a stationary
behavior of rejection probabilities over time.
With respect to our central issue, both risk aversion and gender variables
are signi¯cant. The former indicates that the more risk averse a subject is,
the lower is his or her probability of rejecting a given salary o®er. This result
is not expected, given that no uncertainty is involved in a subjects' decision
to accept or reject a given o®er. Obviously, explaining this ¯nding requires a
more complex dynamic analysis considering rejections as a risky loss of present
gains against the expectation of higher o®ers in the future. Females tend to
reject more than males. Like in the case of the o®er model whose results
biological sex is reported in Meier-Pesti (2005).
18At a 10% signi¯cance level.
19As re°ected on the di®erence of the corresponding coe±cient estimates obtained across
the two alternative o®er models (1 and 2 in Tables 12 and 14, respectively), rising from 0.13
to 0.16.
24were reported above, the combination of these two ¯ndings indicates that the
tendency of females to reject more is a pure gender e®ect going into the opposite
direction as compared to the risk-related e®ect, according to which more risk
averse subjects should be expected to exhibit a lower tendency to reject a given
o®er.
V Conclusions
Regarding salary formation as the result of ultimatum bargaining, our main
result can be stated in two steps. First, in comparison with standard ul-
timatum bargaining experiments, our baseline treatment, framed as a labor
market with a hypothetical task, reproduces the usual 60%-40% \split of the
pie". Second, when employee-subjects are asked to perform a real task, the
resulting salaries are signi¯cantly higher than in the standard no-real-e®ort set-
ting. Following the resemblance between our baseline treatment and previous
abstract (non-labor framed) ultimatum games, the reported salary di®erences
are unambiguously associated with employees' real e®ort. Furthermore, we
show that the e®ect of real e®ort on observed salaries is due to di®erences in
both employer- and employee-subjects' behavior. Speci¯cally, in the real-e®ort
treatment, employers post higher salary o®ers and employees are more likely
to reject.
In this framework, we have focused on country-speci¯c and risk-related de-
terminants of gender e®ects in ultimatum bargaining. We ¯nd that females
from Spain and Greece behave in similar ways, whereas they both di®er in
similar ways from British female bargainers. Speci¯cally, female subjects from
Spain and Greece make lower o®ers than males, whereas no di®erence is ob-
tained between male and female subjects' o®ers in the UK. As far as rejections
are concerned, female subjects from Spain and Greece reject more, while fe-
male subjects from the UK reject less than the corresponding male subjects
do.
25A central issue addressed in this paper is the extent to which gender di®er-
ences in bargaining behavior can be explained as the result of gender di®erences
in decision making under uncertainty. As many researchers have proved, fe-
male subjects are more risk averse than male ones20. This is also con¯rmed
by our results. However, our results indicate that risk averse subjects tend to
post higher wage o®ers and are more likely to accept a given wage. Contrary
to what would be expected from the combination of these two ¯ndings on the
relation between gender and risk aversion and the e®ect of risk aversion on
employer and employee behavior, we ¯nd that females o®er lower wages and
reject more than males do. That is, the gender e®ect estimated from our ex-
perimental data cannot be because but rather despite females higher degree of
risk aversion.
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30VI Appendix
VI.1 Tables and Figures
Table 8: Evolution of o®ers
1st period First 5 periods Last 5 periods Last period
Treatment N Mean St.D. N Mean St.D. N Mean St.D. N Mean St.D.
SNERT SP
Total O®ers 10 3.36 1.41 50 3.68 1.27 50 4.18 1.23 10 4.17 1.26
Male O®ers 4 4.38 0.75 20 4.18 0.80 20 4.63 0.43 4 4.63 0.48
Female O®ers 6 2.68 1.37 30 3.35 1.42 30 3.88 1.49 6 3.87 1.57
SNERT GR
Total O®ers 10 3.80 1.36 50 3.80 0.91 50 4.20 0.24 10 4.17 0.30
Male O®ers 6 4.33 0.84 30 4.20 0.55 30 4.25 0.24 6 4.23 0.29
Female O®ers 4 3.00 1.71 20 3.21 1.04 20 4.14 0.22 4 4.08 0.28
SNERT UK
Total O®ers 10 3.92 1.42 50 4.69 1.24 50 4.90 0.58 10 5.06 0.24
Male O®ers 6 3.78 1.39 30 4.30 1.05 30 4.95 0.32 6 5.00 0.19
Female O®ers 4 4.13 1.65 20 5.27 1.31 20 4.83 0.84 4 5.15 0.30
T1
Total O®ers 10 3.90 0.33 50 3.85 0.30 50 4.01 0.18 10 3.99 0.03
Male O®ers 4 3.75 0.50 20 3.75 0.38 20 4.04 0.14 4 4.00 0.00
Female O®ers 6 4.00 0.13 30 3.92 0.22 30 3.99 0.18 6 3.98 0.04
T2
Total O®ers 10 3.58 0.81 50 3.89 0.68 50 4.84 0.66 10 4.78 0.69
Male O®ers 3 4.00 0.87 15 4.01 0.57 15 4.71 0.64 3 4.43 0.51
Female O®ers 7 3.40 0.77 35 3.84 0.73 35 4.89 0.66 7 4.93 0.73
T3
Total O®ers 10 3.98 1.87 50 3.72 1.44 50 4.14 0.88 10 4.27 0.68
Male O®ers 5 3.90 0.55 25 4.14 0.77 25 3.85 0.94 5 4.04 0.32
Female O®ers 5 4.06 2.75 25 3.30 1.80 25 4.44 0.72 5 4.50 0.90
T4
Total O®ers 10 4.23 1.20 50 4.06 0.78 50 4.28 0.91 10 4.29 0.79
Male O®ers 8 4.10 1.32 40 3.91 0.78 40 4.20 0.97 8 4.24 0.84
Female O®ers 2 4.75 0.35 10 4.68 0.37 10 4.60 0.52 2 4.50 0.71
31Table 9: Evolution of rejected Male and Female Subjects' O®ers
1st period
First 5 Last 5
Last period All periods
periods periods
Treatment N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
SNERT SP
Total Rejections 10 50% 50 36% 50 30% 10 20% 330 33%
Male Of. Rej. 4 25% 20 45% 20 10% 4 0% 132 27%
Female Of. Rej. 6 67% 30 30% 30 43% 6 33% 198 37%
SNERT GR
Total Rejections 10 20% 50 28% 50 20% 10 30% 330 30%
Male Of. Rej. 6 17% 30 20% 30 17% 6 17% 198 28%
Female Of. Rej. 4 25% 20 40% 20 25% 4 50% 132 33%
SNERT UK
Total Rejections 10 50% 50 38% 50 30% 10 20% 330 32%
Male Of. Rej. 6 50% 30 37% 30 30% 6 33% 198 34%
Female Of. Rej. 4 50% 20 40% 20 30% 4 0% 132 29%
T1
Total Rejections 10 10% 50 30% 50 10% 10 10% 330 17%
Male Of. Rej. 4 25% 20 35% 20 0% 4 0% 132 14%
Female Of. Rej. 6 0% 30 27% 30 17% 6 17% 198 19%
T2
Total Rejections 10 40% 50 38% 50 20% 10 20% 330 30%
Male Of. Rej. 3 0% 15 13% 15 7% 3 0% 99 11%
Female Of. Rej. 7 57% 35 49% 35 26% 7 29% 231 38%
T3
Total Rejections 10 30% 50 38% 50 26% 10 10% 330 29%
Male Of. Rej. 5 20% 25 28% 25 28% 5 20% 165 30%
Female Of. Rej. 5 40% 25 48% 25 24% 5 0% 165 28%
T4
Total Rejections 10 40% 50 52% 50 14% 10 20% 330 21%
Male Of. Rej. 8 50% 40 63% 40 18% 8 25% 264 24%
Female Of. Rej. 2 0% 10 10% 10 0% 2 0% 66 8%
32Table 10: Evolution of o®ers rejected by Male and Female Employees
1st period
First 5 Last 5
Last period All periods
periods periods
Treatment N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
SNERT SP
Total Rejections 10 50% 50 36% 50 30% 10 20% 330 33%
Male Reject. 2 50% 10 10% 10 0% 2 0% 66 5%
Female Reject. 8 50% 40 43% 40 38% 8 25% 264 40%
SNERT GR
Total Rejections 10 20% 50 28% 50 20% 10 30% 330 30%
Male Reject. 3 0% 15 13% 15 7% 3 33% 99 18%
Female Reject. 7 29% 35 34% 35 26% 7 29% 231 35%
SNERT UK
Total Rejections 10 50% 50 38% 50 30% 10 20% 330 32%
Male Reject. 6 67% 30 53% 30 33% 6 33% 198 41%
Female Reject. 4 25% 20 15% 20 25% 4 0% 132 17%
T1
Total Rejections 10 10% 50 30% 50 10% 10 10% 330 17%
Male Reject. 7 14% 35 31% 35 9% 7 14% 231 15%
Female Reject. 3 0% 15 27% 15 13% 3 0% 99 21%
T2
Total Rejections 10 40% 50 38% 50 20% 10 20% 330 30%
Male Reject. 7 43% 35 34% 35 17% 7 14% 231 29%
Female Reject. 3 33% 15 47% 15 27% 3 33% 99 31%
T3
Total Rejections 10 30% 50 38% 50 26% 10 10% 330 29%
Male Reject. 10 30% 50 38% 50 26% 10 10% 330 29%
Female Reject. - - - - - - - - - -
T4
Total Rejections 10 40% 50 52% 50 14% 10 20% 330 21%
Male Reject. 2 50% 10 90% 10 10% 2 0% 66 30%
Female Reject. 8 38% 40 43% 40 15% 8 25% 264 19%
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Table 12: Country Speci¯c Models of O®ers
Spain Greece UK
O®er Coe®. t-statistic Coe®. t-statistic Coe®. t-statistic
cons 4.49 37.79¤¤¤ 4.12 35.07¤¤¤ 5.43 27.74¤¤¤
period 0.02 7.85¤¤¤ 0.02 5.41¤¤¤ 0.01 1.34
Ver -0.14 -6.94¤¤¤ -0.07 -3.80¤¤¤ -0.10 -2.72¤¤¤
gender 0.13 2.96¤¤¤ 0.13 2.39¤¤¤ -0.07 -0.88
T1 -0.08 -1.31 - - - -
T2 0.37 5.85¤¤¤ - - - -
T3 -0.04 -0.71 - - - -
T4 0.18 2.72¤¤¤ - - - -
Â2 202.27 42.94 12.59
N 1650 330 330



















35Table 15: Rejection Probability Baseline Model
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Table 16: Country Speci¯c Rejection Probability Models
Spain Greece UK
Prob. of Rejctn. Coe®. t-statistic Coe®. t-statistic Coe®. t-statistic
cons 1.96 6.19¤¤¤ 3.55 3.57¤¤¤ 2.02 3.08¤¤¤
period -0.00 -0.08 0.01 1.15 -0.02 -2.02¤¤¤
Vee 0.09 2.28¤¤¤ 0.16 0.94 0.08 1.28
O®er2 -0.16 -13.85¤¤¤ -0.31 -8.03¤¤¤ -0.14 -7.50¤¤¤
gender -0.53 -2.96¤¤¤ -0.83 -2.58¤¤¤ 1.05 2.08¤¤¤
T1 -0.82 -3.30¤¤¤ - - - -
T2 0.20 0.79 - - - -
T3 -0.08 -0.25 - - - -
T4 -0.28 -1.19 - - - -
Â2 241.31 67.61 63.89
N 1650 330 330
36Table 17: Rejection Probability Model
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Graphs by Treatment and Country
HV Frequencies
Figure 1: Control Question results: Frequencies of hypothetical valuations
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Graphs by Treatment and Country
HV (Male−Female)
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Graphs by Treatment and Country
Evolution of Mean Offers by Gender
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Graphs by Treatment and Country
Offer Frequencies
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Graphs by Treatment and Country
Offer Frequencies by Gender
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Graphs by Treatment and Country
Accepted−Rejected Offer frequencies
Figure 6: Accepted-rejected o®er frequencies.
44VI.2 Instructions to Experimental Subjects (translated
from Spanish)
You are going to participate in an experiment about individual decision mak-
ing, that will last approximately 90 minutes. You must follow the instructions
carefully and, depending on your performance, you may earn a considerable
amount of money. The context in which you will have to take your decisions,
is described below.
This session will consist of two main parts:
² First part: 30-35 rounds of a salary-and-task-negotiation session.
² Second part: Result session: task-performing and payment.
² First Part:
An equal number of employers and employees are in a group of 20 indi-
viduals. At the beginning of the session, you will be randomly assigned
the role of employer or employee. In each period [T2 and T4 ses-
sions: \the session"], you will be randomly matched with a player
of the other type (if you are an employer, you will be matched with an
employee and vice versa). The experiment will be repeated over 30 to 35
periods (randomly determined by the server).
In each period, each employer-employee pair is faced with the following
situation: The employer o®ers the employee a share from a 10e pro¯t
yielded from the task (¯lling 20 envelopes numbered, from 1 to 20, with
their respective one-page letter, also numbered from 1 to 20) which will
be performed (in the second part of the session) by the employee (not
applicable in T1, T2, T3, T4). If the employee accepts, the task
will have to be performed by the employee (see \Second Part") and
the two players' earnings are determined as proposed by the employer.
Otherwise, the task is not performed and both players earn nothing.
45If you are an employer, your decision will consist of o®ering a salary to
the employee. Such a salary will be a quantity between 0 and 10e, in
multiples of 0.10e. If you are an employee, your decision will consist of
accepting or rejecting the salary o®ered by the employer.
² Second part:
Your payment (and the tasks to perform if you are an employee; not
applicable in T1, T2, T3, T4) will be determined according to the
outcome of ¯ve periods, which will be randomly chosen among the total
number of periods played during this session. A minimum of 90% (at
least 18 out of 20 envelopes must contain the correct sheet) reliability will
be required for each task unit to be considered successfully performed.
46VI.3 Questionnaire
Control Question
Imagine you are assigned the role of an \employee" in the following hypothetical
market situation:
An equal number of employers and employees are in a group of 20 individuals,
forming random employee-employer pairs. You are going to negotiate your share
over a total of 10e earned by one of the employers from the task you will perform
(¯lling 20 envelopes numbered, from 1 to 20, with their respective one-page letter,
also numbered from 1 to 20). If you accept the salary, you will perform the task
and earnings for both, you and your employer, will be determined as proposed by
the employer. If you reject the salary, the task is not performed and you both earn
nothing.
Alternatively to your earnings and task-performing obligations, you may prefer a
certain payo®, whose value is provided below, under 20 di®erent scenarios. Please
mark with an \X" your preferred option in each one of the following scenarios:
² SCENARIO 1: You are o®ered an alternative of a certain payment of
0.5e.
Do you prefer the certain payo®? ................................................. ¤
Or your earnings from the above hypothetical market situation?.. ¤
² SCENARIO 2: You are o®ered an alternative of a certain payment of
1e.
Do you prefer the certain payo®? ................................................. ¤
Or your earnings from the above hypothetical market situation?.. ¤
47² SCENARIO 3: You are o®ered an alternative of a certain payment of
1.5e.
Do you prefer the certain payo®? ................................................. ¤
Or your earnings from the above hypothetical market situation?.. ¤
² SCENARIO 4: You are o®ered an alternative of a certain payment of
2e.
Do you prefer the certain payo®? ................................................. ¤
Or your earnings from the above hypothetical market situation?.. ¤
. . .
. . .
² SCENARIO 20: You are o®ered an alternative of a certain payment
of 10e.
Do you prefer the certain payo®? ................................................. ¤
Or your earnings from the above hypothetical market situation?.. ¤
48